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Abstract—The international right to health is enshrined in national
and international law. In a growing number of cases, individuals
denied access to high-cost medicines and technologies under universal
coverage systems have turned to the courts to challenge the denial of
access as against their right to health. In some instances, patients seek
access to medicines, services, or technologies that they would have
access to under universal coverage if not for government, health
system, or service delivery shortfalls. In others, patients seek access to
medicines, services, or technologies that have not been included or
that have been explicitly denied for coverage due to prioritization. In
the former, judicialization of the right to health is critical to ensure
patients access to the technologies or services to which they are
entitled. In the latter, courts may grant patients access to medicines not
covered as a result of explicit priority setting to allocate finite
resources. By doing so, courts may give priority to those with the
means and incentive to turn to the courts, at the expense of the
maximization of equity- and population-based health. Evidence-
based, informed decision-making processes could ensure that the most
clinically and cost-effective products aligning with social value
judgments are prioritized. Governments should be equipped to engage
in and defend rational priority setting, and the priority setting process
and institutions involved should be held accountable through an
opportunity for appeal and judicial review. As a result, the courts
could place greater reliance on the government’s coverage choices,
and the population’s health could be most equitably distributed.
INTRODUCTION
The emergence of advanced health technologies, new phar-
maceuticals and medical devices, and innovative health care
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services has forced governments to make difficult prioritiza-
tion decisions within a limited health care budget. With
implicit priority setting, clinicians use their discretion to
determine who will get what care.1 Under explicit priority
setting, governments can utilize formal processes to allocate
resources to maximize the population health impact of uni-
versal coverage.2 Sometimes these processes are successful,
but other times they fail to give due consideration to financial
or delivery system constraints. Rational priority setting is an
evidence-based form of explicit priority setting. Priority set-
ting is rational when the process is made explicit and trans-
parent, the decision makers are specified, and it is conducted
in a deliberative manner, involving relevant stakeholders,
and in consideration of best available evidence about clinical
and cost-effectiveness and social values.3 The most rational
priority setting processes will also account for the benefit to
patients, the cost, the ethicality and the fairness. As govern-
ments make these prioritization decisions, they face another
challenge: conflict with the judiciary. Individuals often turn
to the court system to argue that denying public coverage of
a given product contradicts their internationally or nationally
guaranteed right to health. And they are often winning their
cases.4 Through this “judicialization” of the right to health,
courts can determine that administrative inefficiencies and
prioritization processes that deny an individual access to his
or her desired, or required, health care service violate that
government’s duty to protect the right to health.5,6
The international right to health is enshrined in major
multilateral treaties and smaller human rights treaties, offer-
ing protection based on gender, race, and age.7 Article 25 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights grants “everyone
. . . the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including . . .
medical care and necessary social services.”8 The United
Nations General Assembly unanimously pronounced the
contents of this Declaration to be a standard for all human
beings in 1948.7 The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Article 12, “recognize[s] the right
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable stan-
dard of physical and mental health.”9 In 2000, the Committee
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights released General
Comment 14 to explain the three right to health obligations
of states: to respect, to protect, and to fulfill.10 The right to
health is also a key element in the World Health Organ-
ization’s Constitution, the preamble of which declares “the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health [to be]
one of the fundamental rights of every human being. . . .”11
Many states have the right to health embedded in domes-
tic law. Over 100 national constitutions contain the right to
health, representing over 50% of United Nations Member
States from Asia and Africa to Europe and Latin America.
They guarantee or aspire to protect a right to health gener-
ally, a right to public or preventive health, and/or a right to
medical care services.12 For example, Article 196 of the Bra-
zilian Constitution mandates that “health is the right of all
and a duty of the State and shall be guaranteed by . . . univer-
sal access to all activities and services for its promotion, pro-
tection, and recovery.”13 Article 19 of the Haitian
Constitution recognizes the State’s “absolute obligation to
guarantee the right to life, health, and respect of the human
person.”14 Many states also incorporate the right to health in
their domestic statutes, which gives it the force of domestic
law and makes it potentially enforceable through the courts.
Citizens have filed writs of protection in mass quantities to
protect these rights.6
The inclusion of the right to health in a state’s constitution
or statute may not even be a necessary condition for citizens
to be able to bring right to health claims against priority set-
ting. In the absence of a nationally explicit right to health
guarantee, citizens turn to the international legal instruments
or to claims based on a national right to life, dignity, or
human integrity.15-18 As a result, legal claims disputing
priority setting pose a challenge to governments engaging in
explicit priority setting, regardless of whether or not a right
to health has been incorporated in the national constitution.
Importantly, this judicialization of the right to health is
often critical for granting access to the health care products
citizens are entitled to under a state’s universal coverage sys-
tem—and indeed would have, if not for government failure.
For example, in 1993, Colombia passed a law creating a two-
tier benefit system utilizing public and private insurers to
purchase health care for patients. The dramatic increase in
court claims following the implementation of the reform was
a sign of systemic failures in its implementation—patients
consistently brought court action to demand access to serv-
ices already in their coverage plans.19 In such cases, the
courts played a fundamental role in exposing systemic ineffi-
ciencies denying citizens access to services to which they
were legally entitled. Similarly, the courts of Brazil, Costa
Rica, and Argentina have handed down a number of rulings
that expose the lack of enforcement of the established
priorities.20
In a second type of judicialization of the right to
health, patients challenge explicit and ostensibly reason-
able priority-setting decisions that deny access to care—
care that then sometimes is prescribed by a physician
even though not in the benefits package. Thereby, courts
override a government’s official priority-setting process.
24 Health Systems & Reform, Vol. 2 (2016), No. 1
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Sometimes the government’s decision not to include a
technology in the health benefit package may have been
ill-advised, and the court’s granting of an individual criti-
cal access to a necessary technology may be a desirable
correction. However, if the government made an informed
priority-setting decision that courts nonetheless overturn,
the judicialization of the right to health may threaten rea-
sonable and responsible decisions by the government.
Thus, if governments use a fair and rational process based
on evidence and carefully stated value judgments, and do
so via an ethically acceptable process, should the courts
be enabled nonetheless to overturn those decisions?
We recognize the importance of the judicialization of the
right to health, because it can be vital to ensure that govern-
ments abide by the letter and spirit of international human
rights. However, rational priority setting based on evidence
and with an eye to equity is, we argue, the best way to safe-
guard an ethical allocation of scarce health care resources,
and it should be protected. We propose methods to ensure that
governments engage in rational priority-setting processes and
to equip courts with the tools necessary to assess whether or
not rational priority setting has been conducted. With this
knowledge, courts can better decide whether exclusion of a
health care product truly threatens the right to health.
THE ETHICS OF ALLOCATING RESOURCES
Priority setting confronts a critical question: how does soci-
ety ethically allocate scarce resources? Patients utilizing
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, or similar rights, in their right to health
claim could argue that they have a right to their “highest
attainable standard” of health, for example.9,17 However,
states cannot guarantee a carte blanche highest attainable
standard of health to every citizen without consideration of
resource constraints. Attempting to meet the maximal health
care needs of every individual would overwhelm a society’s
capacity to provide other social goods, such as education and
defense.21 The question, then, is: what is a reasonable princi-
ple for allocating resources, and to what body is the decision
maker accountable in applying such a principle?
Equity and ethics should be critical considerations to
ensure proper priority setting. Governments should consider
whether the interests of some groups are unfairly promoted
over those of another. Attention to the principle of equity in
access to care, quality of care, outcomes, and financial pro-
tection can promote a fair distribution of benefits across dif-
ferent population and disease groups.22
When seeking to maximize population health, the govern-
ment should not disregard its ethical obligation to secure ben-
efits for, and reduce harms to, individuals.22 In some
instances, attention to population-level health may disregard
the individualized needs of a highly vulnerable disease
group. The government may wish to develop policies to rec-
ognize and offer protections for these highly individualized
needs. It is important to give particular attention to the needs
of society’s most vulnerable and marginalized inhabitants.
Even if an intervention is not the most cost-effective, it may
be necessary to ensure vulnerable disease groups an equal
opportunity to their right to health. Court decisions to over-
turn a coverage decision may maximize individual health
only for those with the resources to bring a claim but not
those in vulnerable disease groups.
An equitable benefits package generally excludes health
care products that cannot be provided to everyone for whom
that product is medically indicated.22 A court’s decision to
grant a patient access to the product she demands typically
applies only to that patient.5 Thus, decisions granting indi-
viduals access to the interventions they demand can create
horizontal inequity because others having the same need for
the intervention are treated differently.6 If we understood the
right to health strictly on an individual level the outcome is
likely to be an unequal, subjective access to the highest
attainable health standard. To prevent this, courts could seek
to uphold priority setting decisions when they are in reason-
able alignment with the evidence and the social value judg-
ments of that broader society.21,23
The highest attainable standard of health of a citizenry can
only be determined within the confines of what the country
can fairly afford. This is true as long as the government is
already allocating a fair percentage of its total budget to
health care. By granting access to products based on an indi-
vidual’s right to health without carefully considering that the
product may have been rationally denied, courts could secure
one individual access to a product unaffordable for all who
would need it. In doing so, the courts threaten the broader
population right to health.24
WHEN THE ETHICAL AND EQUITABLE
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES IS PUT AT RISK
The primary goal of a universal health coverage system is to
achieve the highest level of service coverage for the popula-
tion as a whole. If the government indiscriminately granted
access to all products patients requested or doctors pre-
scribed, it would risk deflecting scarce resources from
low-cost, high-effectiveness, broad-impact products toward
high-cost, low-potential products.
Dittrich et al.: Right to Health and Priority Setting for UHC 25
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InMarquez Velazquez Antonio Gerardo vs. Ministry of Pub-
lic Health, the Uruguayan court granted a patient access to the
drug Sunitinib after Sorafenib failed to treat his metastatic kid-
ney cancer. Sunitinib was subsequently included on the
national drug form. However, the level 1 studies required by
regulation to prove the drug’s effectiveness subsequent to Sora-
fenib—and place it on the national drug form for subsequent
use—had never been conducted. The court found it “manifestly
illegitimate” to require proof of the effectiveness of using the
treatments in sequential order, stating that it is the physician’s
job only to provide means, not to produce results. It states that
a “high level of scientific evidence” supports the use of Suniti-
nib subsequent to Sorafenib, and “the only way to know
whether the drug works is to give it to the patient.”25 The Ger-
ardo decision challenges Uruguay’s efforts to set up an evi-
dence-based system for priority setting and undermines the
financial solvency of its health care system.
Some courts place greater weight on the opinion of the
recommending physician than that of government-provided
clinical experts or the protocol for determining coverage
itself.6,26,27 At times, this is due to poor representation by the
government to support its method of priority setting and to
challenge contradicting evidence.28 However, it is often due
to judicial deference to the prescribing physician. One study
of relevant Brazilian court decisions between 2007 and 2008
found that 97% of cases were decided on the medical evi-
dence provided by the prescribing physician, without consid-
ering the quality of the treatment, patient need, or alternative
treatment options.27,29
Costa Rican courts frequently decided that a prescription
from the prescribing physician outweighs the technical stand-
ards used to determine coverage.26 In Ms. Vera Salazar Nav-
arro vs. Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the Costa Rican
Social Security Institution refused to cover the branded drug
Ms. Navarro demanded for her multiple sclerosis, instead offer-
ing to reimburse the less expensive generic option. The court
ordered the Institution to reimburse the branded alternative, on
the basis that the Institution breached the patient’s right to
health by refusing to cover the exact drug the physician pre-
scribed.15 In the last three years, however, Cost Rican courts
have begun to give more weight to the evidence supporting a
coverage decision, signaling that they may be prepared to offer
greater deference to rational priority setting.
Undue reliance on the prescribing physician’s medical
opinion is troublesome for three reasons. First, evidence sug-
gests wealthier individuals from higher-income neighborhoods
disproportionately file right to health claims, especially when
private attorneys litigate, granting them unequal benefit to
unique physician prescriptions.30-32 Governments often decline
to add a product to the universal coverage benefits basket fol-
lowing a judicial order to provide it to an individual patient.
The benefit is granted only to the person bringing the legal
claim, unless the court expands its ruling to the entire patient
class. This is particularly true in civil legal systems, where
courts are not required to follow the precedent of prior
decisions—each case stands on its own.
Second, the motivations of the prescribing physician in
recommending uncovered products are not always clear.
Even if patients are not primarily higher-income individuals
with private representation, public representation of right to
health cases may be just as worrisome. In many instances,
civic associations or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
file lawsuits on behalf of patients. The majority of patients
do not know the name or location of the NGO or association
filing on their behalf, NGOs often file claims on behalf of
specific disease groups, and patient groups offering legal
advice can be openly funded by pharmaceutical companies.
This suggests that pharmaceutical companies may be playing
an indirect role in sponsoring litigation to gain government
support for their products.20,27,30,31 A large percentage of
cases can be filed by a small proportion of attorneys on
behalf of prescriptions written by a modest proportion of
physicians.31 Again, this evidence invites the hypothesis of a
relationship between NGOs, physicians, attorneys, and phar-
maceutical companies.
Finally, physicians may make individualized decisions for
their patients unsupported by the evidence.26 In Hernandez
Edward vs. Fondo Nacional de Recursos, the Uruguayan
court granted a liver cancer patient access to Sorafenib, a
drug placed on the country’s Therapeutic Drug Roster for
renal cancer and not general oncological treatment. The court
determined it a “technicality” that the drug was covered for
one type of cancer and not another, stating, “Prescriptions
and therapies chosen by the physician cannot be dictated by
politicians and administrative authorities.”33 Drug rosters
may sometimes be bereft of important and well-recognized
uses for pharmaceuticals. However, where the government
has made inclusion decisions based on clinical evidence,
overturning those decisions can force the government to fund
off-label prescribing or experimental treatments. A study by
Norheim and Wilson reviewed 37 successful cases in Costa
Rica in 2008 and found that approximately 70% of the deci-
sions granted access to low-priority or experimental drugs
(where priority was determined by the severity of the disease
without the new drug and the effectiveness and cost-effec-
tiveness of that drug).26 The Brazilian health benefits basket
includes a less expensive alternative for up to 80% of the
drugs granted to patients by judicial order.32
26 Health Systems & Reform, Vol. 2 (2016), No. 1
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [9
8.2
18
.23
5.1
40
] a
t 0
8:2
0 2
6 J
an
ua
ry
 20
16
 
Where the priority-setting efforts of a government are
unscientific, unfairly developed, politically motivated, or
have other flaws, judicial review of a government’s decision
to deny or fail to properly provide technology coverage is
critical. In 2002, the Treatment Action Campaign challenged
the South African government’s creation of a public health
program designed to mitigate mother-to-child HIV transmis-
sion. The program offered free Nevirapine at certain pilot
sites to HIV-positive pregnant women to prevent transmis-
sion with no timeline for national expansion. The court held
that the government was not taking reasonable steps to
reduce mother-to-child transmission and ordered it to
develop a comprehensive, countrywide program. It found
that the government could reasonably utilize a pilot program
to gather evidence on scalability and efficacy but could not
wait until it had developed the best program to disseminate it
nationwide.34
The South African case of Minister of Health vs. Treat-
ment Action Campaign is highly regarded as a judicialization
of the right to health success story. There are many other
similarly successful cases. Some population-based rulings in
Latin America, where civil law systems are prominent, have
had similarly progressive effects. However, the differences
between this case and those presented earlier are significant.
First, the court’s decision remedied an inequality of like indi-
viduals treated differently, strictly according to where they
lived. Second, the court recognized the value in determining
the efficacy of a treatment before offering it to the public.
Third, the court identified and remedied a population-wide
problem afflicting pregnant women with HIV, and its deci-
sion would go on to have an impact on that entire population.
This is not to say that proper judicialization of the right to
health requires a population-based claim—in a number of
instances, courts have granted individuals access to drugs
internationally recognized to be clinically and cost-effective,
such as antiretroviral therapy for HIV.35,36 However, if deci-
sions are made without any strategies for assessing the ratio-
nality of priority setting, the judicialization of the right to
health may continue to put at risk the government’s ability to
utilize resources to maximize population-based health. The
trend toward judicialization is growing; Thailand just over-
turned the government’s decision to exclude glucosamine
from its benefit package, marking its first ever case judicial-
izing the right to health.37 It is therefore becoming more
important than ever to equip health systems with skills to
engage in and defend rational priority setting. Courts must
also be empowered with the tools, such as a thorough under-
standing of the need for, and process of, rational priority set-
ting to determine the legitimacy of a government’s inclusion
or exclusion decision.
SEEKING A NEW BALANCE FOR THE ROLE OF
THE COURTS
Earlier, we argued that coverage decisions under a universal
health coverage scheme should ensure fair allocation of
resources in order to maximize population health. To ensure
that such decisions are made, we should promote informed
judicial decision-making and guarantee rational priority
setting.
The strength and role of the courts in adjudicating the
right to health will always vary across countries, especially
considering the tendency of some judicial systems to be
more deferential to government policy than others. Despite
the variety across court systems, every health system could
benefit from utilizing experts to represent the government’s
priority-setting decisions, with force equal to the patient’s
representation—thereby strengthening the health system’s
legal defense. Scientific experts could bring to bear methodo-
logically sound studies rigorously evaluating the cost and
effectiveness of medical products. Other health system
experts could illuminate the social value judgments relied on
to make coverage decisions. Evidence should support prior-
ity setting from a scientific standpoint (for example, by pro-
viding solid, clear evidence of the basis by which a product’s
coverage is denied) or a social standpoint—and not simply
the administrative technicalities of priority setting. Experts
could also strengthen the government’s defense by arguing
the collective impact that coverage would have if granted to
everyone in need of the patient’s desired product. Courts are
better able to opine on the collective impact a decision would
have on scarce resources.27
However, it would be insufficient to equip governments
only with tools for better defense for three reasons. First, a
weak defense is not always the problem. In certain instan-
ces, cases for access are argued before the health system
has evaluated the value of that technology and the govern-
ment has not yet collected the evidence required to support
its decision for or against coverage.38 Second, what if the
government’s priorities were irrational or misguided? The
courts surely have a role in ensuring that the government
has followed the procedures it has undertaken to follow and
has abided by the criteria and principles by which it has
said it would abide.
Finally, evidence suggests that courts sometimes lack trust
in the priority-setting process that would make them comfort-
able relying on it. The Mexican Supreme Court recently post-
poned its decision to grant access to the expensive drug
Eculizumab, requiring further review by the commission
responsible for designing the benefit plan. In doing so, it rec-
ognized the need for external review of priority setting but
Dittrich et al.: Right to Health and Priority Setting for UHC 27
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also expressed concern that the commission to which it
deferred might not meet transparency and other fair process
standards.39,40 Mexico’s Supreme Court decision offers two
important lessons: first, that courts may be willing to recog-
nize their limitations on reviewing priority setting and, sec-
ond, that courts desire the ability to defer to a fair,
defendable priority-setting process. If we encourage coun-
tries to engage in rational priority setting to determine their
benefits package, countries would then make the most evi-
dence-based decisions about coverage that are defensible in
court.
Countries differ greatly in access to resources for priority
setting, capacity to conduct priority setting, and cultural and
institutional interpretations of key priority-setting processes
and values.23 It would be infeasible to advocate a single,
standardized system of rational priority setting. However, all
countries could strive to engage in rational priority setting
through an explicit, transparent, evidence-based approach,
such as health technology assessment (HTA). Using results
from clinical trials and epidemiological data on effective-
ness, HTA identifies the health care products that work best,
for whom they work best, how they compare to their alterna-
tives, and how much demand they place on the health sys-
tem’s resources.41 An assessment considers the social,
economic, organizational, and ethical issues of a health inter-
vention to inform policy decision-making.42
After an initial recommendation based on cost- and clini-
cal-effectiveness and social considerations, HTA processes
can include an appeals process for independent review of the
prioritization decision by health system and health care
experts. Many countries offer stakeholders the opportunity to
appeal (or request independent review) of the final recom-
mendation or to seek judicial review.43 The National Institute
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) offers a prime exam-
ple. NICE functions as the National Health Service’s HTA
agency for England and Wales. As one of the leading HTA
agencies internationally, NICE offers the opportunity to
appeal its decision if it may have acted unfairly or exceeded
its powers, or made a recommendation unreasonable in light
of the evidence.44 Even after the appeals panel makes a
determination, the decision may still be appealed for judicial
review based on grounds such as procedural unfairness, dis-
crimination, or irrationality.45 An opportunity for appeal
(before judicial review) could be incorporated in HTA pro-
cesses more widely.
Daniels’ “accountability for reasonableness” principles
are often invoked to guide a fair process of limit-setting
decision-making.46 Daniels argues that society may not reach
a general consensus on what is necessarily fair prioritization,
but four principles guide a fair process for prioritization. He
suggests that it requires transparency, rationale for the rele-
vance of the decision under resource constraints, a mecha-
nism for challenging the decision, and regulation or
enforcement of the process.46,47
Rational priority setting with the opportunity to appeal
promotes accountability for reasonableness. The priority-set-
ting process transparently considers the evidence and social
values important to making a fair coverage decision, and it
often invites stakeholder participation to make important
decisions balancing the evidence with value judgments.48-50
In doing so, countries can also strive to maximize popula-
tion-based health while accommodating specific disease
groups and marginalized populations according to society-
specific values. An appeals process could offer the opportu-
nity to challenge the validity of the decision, and judicial
review the ability to ensure that the process of priority setting
has been undertaken rationally. In theory, accountability for
reasonableness increases transparency and the existence of
intrinsic health system mechanisms for patients to challenge
coverage decisions, which could deter them from turning to
the court systems.
The way in which countries implement a three-step pro-
cess of (1) rational priority setting, (2) appeal, and (3) judi-
cial review (Fig. 1) will differ depending on resource
constraints, political systems, and social values. The United
Kingdom’s experience suggests that courts embrace their
role reviewing procedural fairness and rationality of NICE’s
decisions. Cases seeking access to a specific product may
instead occur when NICE has not yet reviewed the interven-
tion.51 The experience of countries that have thus far engaged
FIGURE 1. Three Stages of Accountability
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heavily in the judicialization of the right to health could be
quite different. However, as countries advance toward ratio-
nal priority setting, they have an opportunity to ask critical
questions about the impact that rational priority-setting pro-
cesses have on the court’s decision-making. Are courts more
likely to uphold the government’s exclusion decisions when
they have been made using HTA or other rational priority-
setting processes? Do courts rely on the clinical- and cost-
effectiveness evidence demonstrating the collective impact
of access to a product? Does the opportunity for appeal or
judicial review decrease the number of right to health court
claims?
Ultimately, encouraging countries to engage in rational
priority setting through utilizing HTA addresses three major
concerns with the judicialization of the right to health. First,
the evidence resulting from the HTA process can present to
courts hard cost- and clinical-effectiveness data and the
social value judgments relied on to drive the government’s
priority-setting decision. Second, the structured process for
priority-setting decision-making may give courts greater reli-
ance on, and trust in, the government’s decision to include or
exclude a given product, responding to the hesitations
expressed in the Mexican case considering Eculizumab.
Finally, by considering clinical-effectiveness, cost-effective-
ness, and social values, decision makers can account for the
societal-level impact of, and need for, a technology. In doing
so, they can be encouraged to consider equity-based princi-
ples to ensure a population-based right to health when engag-
ing in rational priority setting.
However, the three stages of accountability will only suc-
ceed through cooperation between the courts, health policy
makers, and government officials. In order for the courts to
be comfortable reviewing the process of HTA rather than the
decision itself, they must be certain that (1) the appeals pro-
cess fairly reviews the coverage decision and (2) the initial
HTA process rationally considers the social and scientific
evidence. To do so, HTA processes should aim to utilize the
evidence to make coverage decisions that treat like people
similarly, just as the court aimed to remedy in Treatment
Action Campaign. Governments can account for societal-
level values and specific disease groups as they see fit but
allocate resources equitably by ensuring that each member of
a group is treated alike. If rational priority setting is evidence
and equity based, courts can be empowered to rely more
heavily on the government’s coverage decision and instead
assess the rationality of the process.
Implementing and cultivating rational priority setting will
require the combined efforts of governments to adopt an
appropriate process and courts to place greater weight in the
evidence—maximizing population health while being atten-
tive to the vulnerable and marginalized. With such a balance,
rational priority setting and the judicialization of the right to
health can and should coexist. The courts should continue to
play a fundamental role in overseeing procedural justice
within rational priority setting and enforcing adequate deliv-
ery of the prioritized technologies.
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